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Abstract
Opioid overdose is the leading cause of unintentional death in the U.S. Narcan TM (Naloxone)
is a prescription medicine that can reverse overdose eects. This research investigates the eect
of Naloxone access laws on overdose death rates using state and temporal variation in the
enactment of these laws. We also explore possible spillover eects between Naloxone access
laws and overdose death rates across states. Our analyses reveal that when broken down by
access law provisions, there exists a mixture of positive and negative eects on overdose death
rates depending upon the provision. The results indicate that Naloxone access provisions have
regional impacts by inuencing overdose death rates within the state enacted and have a spillover
eect in neighboring states. The magnitude of spillover eects is larger than direct eects in
the states. Looking across multiple provisions, our ndings provide no statistical evidence that
these laws reduce opioid death rates.
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1

Introduction

Opioid overdose is the leading cause of unintentional death in the U.S. (Visconti et al. (2015)). From
2000 to 2014, half a million people in the U.S. died from opioid overdoses, with over 28,000 dying

1 Overdose deaths have become such a problem in the U.S. that life expectancy has

in 2014 alone.

dropped two years in a row (Stobbe, 2017. State response to the opioid crisis can be categorized by
attempts to limit the supply of opioids through prescription drug monitoring programs and attempts
to reduce the number of overdoses by authorizing the provision of drugs such as Naloxone (Davis
and Chang (2013); Davis et al. (2013); Davis et al. (2014)). Naloxone is a prescription drug that
counteracts the eects of an overdose, making it an extremely powerful, though complicated, drug
in that its provision may create a false sense of security among addicts.
In this research, we estimate the eect of state level Naloxone access laws on overdose deaths
using a spatial dierence-in-dierences framework. This analysis provides us with estimates of both
within state and the spillover eects among contiguous states from enacting a Naloxone access
law.

The spillover analysis allows us to document biases of the standard model.

We nd that

when Naloxone access laws are broken down by their provisions, a mixture of positive and negative
impacts on opioid overdose death rates occurs, particularly within neighboring states. These results
mean that state level adaptation of a Naloxone access law is associated primarily with either higher
or lower opioid overdose deaths in neighboring states, and within the state itself. Thus, important
spillover eects exist from the various provisions of Naloxone access laws on opioid overdose death
rates.
Our main contribution to the literature is developing a SDID (Spatial Dierence in Dierence)
framework to investigate the spillover eects of state level Naloxone access laws on overdose death
rates in surrounding states. In addition, we examine the dierent impacts of version provisions of
access law as explained in section 2. Enactment of Naloxone access laws demonstrates suggestive
evidence of spatial dependence in that neighboring states begin to adopt these laws, especially after

2

2013 . To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has controlled for the spatial interaction
between Naloxone access laws and opioid overdose death rates so that the regional aspects of these
laws has not been investigated.
The rest of the manuscript proceeds as follows. Section two provides background information
on trends in opioid overdose and Naloxone access laws. Section three provides an empirical model
and section four describes the data. In section ve, we explain the method and spatial econometric
framework.

Section six reports the results and robustness checks.

We conclude in section seven

with a discussion and policy implications.

2

Background

2.1

Opioid Trends

3

Mortality from opioid overdose has more than quadrupled since 1999 . Figure 1 compares opioid
overdose death rates among states in 1999 and 2014. Opioid overdose death rate increased during
this time period in every state.

In 2014, West Virginia had the highest rate of overdose death,

while North Dakota had the lowest rate of overdose deaths. Between 1999 and 2014, increases in
opioid overdose death rates ranged from 3.25 per 100,000 in California to 28.30 per 100,000 in West
Virginia.

1

For more information please refer to Rudd et al. (2016)
Available at: http://lawatlas.org/
3
Available at: https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html
2
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Figure 1: Opioid overdose death per 100,000, 1999 and 2014

Overdoses occur when a person takes a lethal or toxic amount of opiates  such as an illicit
drug (e.g.

heroin) or prescription medications (e.g.

4

oxycodone). .

Opiate overdoses can lead to

depressed or slowed breathing, confusion, lack of oxygen to the brain, and possibly even death.
Opioids have the potential for misuse even when prescribed for a legitimate reasons, such as a
work-related injury.

5

In 2015, 2.8 million private industry workers and 752,000 public sector workers suered from
nonfatal workplace injuries, many of which led to opioid receipt and potentially addiction and/or

6 Former Food and Drug Administration head David Kessler called the
7
opioid epidemic one of the great mistakes of modern medicine ), workplace injuries were a driver

overdose (Salsberg, 2015).

for prescribing opioids that have the potential to transform into addiction and ultimately overdose
and death.
Reducing opioid abuse and controlling overdose deaths is an important policy goal for both
state and federal governments. For many years, opioid overdose prevention programs have provided
protection services. Since 1996, an increasing number of community based programs have provided

8

Naloxone (a non-controlled substance opioid ) to laypersons to reverse the eects of opioid overdose.
Narcan TM (Naloxone) is a prescription medicine that can block the eects of opioids with no life
threatening eects on the opiate users.

9 Naloxone acts on a person's brain by attaching to the same

part of the brain that receive the opioid (Naloxoneinfo, 2017). Once administered, Naloxone takes
two to three minutes for its eect to occur. If an overdose victim does not wake up, a second dose
should be delivered.
Examples of Naloxone saving lives abound. For instance, Chad Ward, an Emergency Medical
Services Supervisor in Huntington, WV noted that in 2015, there was 944 drug overdoses in Cabell
County, which is 300% more than overdoses in 2014. By having access to Naloxone, Chad is able to
save many patients.

4

10 . In another more famous example, the musician Prince suered an oxycodone

Importantly, many legally prescribed opioids are taken illegally by individuals who were not the original patient.
Available at: http://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-treatment/treatment/opioid-overdose
6
Available at: https://apnews.com/ccea326c84b747cdb1d7b83efdb303/workers-comp-programs-ght-addictionamong-injured-workers
7
Available at:
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/former-fda-head-doctor-david-kessler-opioid-epidemic-one-ofgreat-mistakes-of-modern-medicine/
8
A controlled substance is generally an opioid or chemical whose manufacture, possession, or use is regulated by
a government, such as illicitly used opioids or prescription medications.
9
Available at: http://stopoverdoseil.org/narcan.html
10
Available at: http://www.wsaz.com/content/news/WSAZ-Investigates-A-Dose-of-Reality-368538771.html
5
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overdose on April 15, 2016. After giving two doses of Narcan he recovered. However, six days later,
he overdosed for the last time on Fentanyl a synthetic opioid 50 times more powerful than heroin
.

11

The examples above demonstrate the conicting viewpoints of Naloxone.

Whether Naloxone

saves lives or simply delays overdose death is the paradox at the center of whether it is a solution to

12 ,13 ,14 ,15 That it may give a false sense of security to users makes Naloxone
16 Maine Governor, Paul LePage is
a prime example of a moral hazard issue in health economics.
the overdose epidemic.

among the most outspoken of Naloxone access opponents who believes by providing Naloxone to
opioid users, they may be saved once, but they are just going to die later .

17

With the growth in overdose deaths, interest in assessing the eects of Naloxone access laws and
overdose prevention programs on overdose deaths has increased (e.g. Walley et al. (2013); Visconti
et al. (2015). Adaption of the Naloxone access laws is associated with a 9 to 11 percent reduction in
opioid- related deaths (Rees et al. (2017)). In another study, Siegler (2015) found a 16% decrease,
but his results were not statistically signicant for heroin-related overdose mortality in New York
City after the implementation of overdose prevention program. Similarly, Rees et al. (2017) nd
statistically insignicant eects of the Naloxone access law on heroin-related deaths in the U.S.
No previous research has accounted for the spatial spillovers of access laws between states.
Without accounting for spatial spillovers, the results may be biased due to model misspecication.
In other words, by ignoring spatial aspects, only within state eects of the law are examined with
the assumptions that an access law and overdose death rate in one state are totally independent of
access laws and death rates in neighboring states. These assumptions ignore the eects of access
laws on adjacent states which could be in a same direction or opposite.

2.2

Naloxone Access Laws

Naloxone has been available by prescription since 1996 although the legal environments for prescribing and dispensing Naloxone varies by state. State legislations have enacted a variety of provisions
to expand and ease prescribing and distributing Naloxone to prevent overdoses.

For example, a

number of states have passed laws that involve less civil and criminal liability, whether for prescribers, dispensers or users (Lim et al. (2016)). The reasoning behind implementing these laws was
to remove the barriers to Naloxone distribution and use.

In some states, prescriptions of Nalox-

one can be authorized to third parties, while in other states, laypersons are immune from criminal
and/or civil liability when administering Naloxone. Additional versions of the law remove criminal
liability for possession of Naloxone. In some states prescribing by a standing order

18 is authorized

while in other states it is not.
The list below provides our breakdown of Naloxone access law provisions into eleven types of
provisions.

11

Available at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ocial-pills-found-at-princes-estate-contained-fentanyl/
Available
at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/us/opioids-narcan-drug-overdose-heroinfentanyl.html?emc=eta1
13
Available at: http://www.wsaz.com/content/news/WSAZ-Investigates-A-Dose-of-Reality-368538771.html
14
Available at: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ocial-pills-found-at-princes-estate-contained-fentanyl/
15
Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4675355/pdf/nihms742274.pdf
16
Available at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/us/naloxone-eases-pain-of-heroin-epidemic-but-notwithout-consequences.html?emc=eta1
17
Available
at:
http://www.hungtonpost.com/entry/maine-governor-paul-lepage-heroinaddicts_us_5717ef01e4b0479c59d6e865
18
A standing order is a physician's order that can be carried out by other health care workers when predetermined
conditions have been met. Available at: http://naloxoneinfo.org/case-studies/standing-orders
12
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NAL 1. Having a Naloxone access law
NAL 2.

Having immunity from criminal prosecution for prescribing, dispensing or distributing

Naloxone to a layperson for prescribers
NAL 3. Having immunity from civil liability for prescribing, dispensing or distributing Naloxone to
a layperson for prescribers
NAL 4.

Having immunity from professional sanctions for prescribing, dispensing or distributing

Naloxone to a layperson for prescribers
NAL 5.

Having immunity from criminal prosecution for prescribing, dispensing or distributing

Naloxone to a layperson for dispensers
NAL 6. Having immunity from civil liability for prescribing, dispensing or distributing Naloxone to
a layperson for dispensers
NAL 7.

Having immunity from professional sanctions for prescribing, dispensing or distributing

Naloxone to a layperson for dispensers
NAL 8. Third parties' authorization to prescribe Naloxone
NAL 9. Pharmacists are allowed to dispense or distribute naloxone without a patient- specic prescription from another medical professional.
NAL 10. Immunity from criminal liability when administering Naloxone for a layperson
NAL 11. Immunity from civil liability when administering Naloxone for a layperson
NAL 12. Removing criminal liability for possession of Naloxone
New Mexico was the rst state to amend its laws (in 2001) to make it easier for medical professionals to prescribe Naloxone and for lay administrators to use it without fear of legal repercussions.
Table 1 shows the eective date of the Naloxone law passed starting from 2001. A total of 27 states
and the District of Columbia adopted a Naloxone access law prior to 2015 with an additional 18
states adopting laws since 2015. Twenty-three of these states allowed standing orders (also called
non-patient-specic prescriptions) (Rees et al., 2017). Figure 2 shows the distribution of Naloxone
access law at two points of time: 2001 and 2014. As shown in this gure, states with access laws
by 2014 are concentrated on the east and west coasts. Table 2 demonstrates the eective years for
dierent provisions of Naloxone access laws. For instance, while New Mexico was the rst state to
enact Naloxone access laws, they did not enact provisions authorizing standing order prescription
or removing criminal liability for possession.
Numerous studies have analyzed the relationships between Naloxone access laws and overdose
deaths (Con et al. (2003); Seal et al. (2005); Walley et al. (2013); Davis (2015); Davis and
Carr (2015); Rowe et al. (2016); Con and Sullivan (2013); Enteen et al. (2010); Green et al.
(2008); Green et al. (2015) Inocencio et al. (2013); Lim et al. (2016); Wheeler et al. (2012)). These
studies generally investigate the eectiveness of Naloxone access on overdose deaths in observational
settings.

For instance, according to Wheeler et al. (2012) between 1996 and 2014, community
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organizations provided Naloxone rescue kits to 152,283 laypersons and received reports of 26,463
overdose reversals. Evidence of Naloxone access laws as an overdose prevention tool in a nationwide
and regional scale is still mixed.

In this study, we employ state level analysis in the dates of

enacting Naloxone access law to investigate the spillover eects of law enactment at the national
level to investigate if there is any regional spillover eects in opioid overdose and the Naloxone
access law enactment.
Table 1: Eective dates of Naloxone Access Laws, 1999-2014

State
California
Colorado

Naloxone Access Law eective date
January 1, 2008
May 10, 2013

Connecticut

October 1, 2003

Washington, D.C.

March 19, 2013

Delaware

August 4, 2014

Georgia

April 24, 2014

Illinois
Kentucky
Maine

January 1, 2010
June 25, 2013
April 29, 2014

Maryland

October 1, 2013

Massachusetts

August 2, 2012

Michigan
Minnesota
New Jersey

October 14, 2014
May 10, 2014
July 1, 2013

New Mexico

April 3, 2001

New York

April 1, 2006

North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon

April 9, 2013
March 11, 2014
November 1, 2013
June 6, 2013

Pennsylvania

November 29, 2014

Rhode Island

June 18, 2012

Tennessee
Utah
Vermont
Virginia

July 1, 2014
May 13, 2014
July 1, 2013
July 1, 2013

Washington

June 10, 2010

Wisconsin

April 9, 2014

Note: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Nevada, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
and West Virginia have adopted Naloxone access laws since 2014.
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Figure 2: Naloxone Access Law in 2001 and 2014

Table 2: Eective dates of Naloxone Access Law Provisions, 1999-2014

Year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

2013

2014

NL2
NM

NL3
NM

CT

CT

NL4

NL5
NM

NL6
NM

CT

CT

NL7

NL8
NM

NL9

NL10
NM

IL

IL
WA
CA
RI

NL11
NM

NL12

RI
CO
DC
KY
NJ
NC
OR
VT
VA

MA

NY
CA

CA

CA

CA

IL
WA

IL
WA

MA
CO
NJ
NC
VT

DE
GA
MN
OH
PA
UT
WI

CO
NJ
NC
VT

DE
GA
MI
MN
OH
PA
TN
UT
WI

CO
KY
MD
NJ

CA
DE
GA
OH
PA
RI
TN
UT
WI

CO
NJ
VT

DE
GA
PA
UT
WI

CO
NJ
VT

DE
GA
MI
MN
PA
TN
UT
WI

CO
KY
MD
NJ

CA
DE
GA
PA
RI
TN
UT
WI

IL
WA
MA
KY
MD
NJ
NC
OK
OR
VT
VA
CA
GA
ME
MI
OH
PA
RI
TN
UT
WI

KY
NJ
NC
OR
VT
CA
DE
GA
MA
MN
NM
NY
OK
PA
RI
TN
WI

CO
DC
KY
NJ
NC
VT

CT
GA
MA
MI
MN
NY
OH
PA
WI

CT
GA
MI
MN
NY
PA
TN
UT
WI

DC
VT
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3

Empirical Models

Empirical studies have shown that a number of factors inuence opioid overdose deaths in the
U.S. Despite The opioid epidemic literature is lacking investigations that include the eects of
high-risk injury occupations such as mining, manufacturing and constructions, availability of drug
prescriptions and heroin related crime (as an indicator for availability of heroin) on opioid overdose
deaths. Table 3 shows the important variables, study region, their impact on overdose deaths and
the reference.
Table 3: Eective dates of Naloxone Access Law Provisions, 1999-2014

Variable
Poverty
Income distribution
External characteristics of neighborhood
Internal characteristics of neighborhood
Police activity
Unemployment
Per capita GDP
Urbanization
Couples' separation
Demographic factors (African-American men)
Location relative to the U.S.-Mexico border
Heroin source/type, price and purity
Educational attainment
State medical cannabis laws
Uninsured adults and health care cost
Substance Abuse Insurance Mandates

Study Region
New York City
districts
New York City
neighborhoods
New York City
neighborhoods
New York City
neighborhoods
New York City
neighborhoods
New York City
police precinct
Italy provinces
Italy provinces
Italy provinces
Italy provinces
Chicago
neighborhoods
New Mexico
counties
27 U.S. MSAs
U.S states
U.S states
New Mexico
counties
U.S states

Coecient Sign
+

Reference
Marzuk et al., 1997

-

Galea et al., 2003
Nandi et al., 2006
Hembree et al., 2005

-

Hembree et al., 2005

+

Nandi et al., 2006
Bohnert et al., 2011

+
+
+
+

Gatti et al., 2007
Gatti et al., 2007
Gatti et al., 2007
Gatti et al., 2007
Scott et al., 2007

-

Shah et al., 2012

+/-

Unick et al., 2014
Richardson et al., 2015
Bachhuber et al., 2014
Shah et al., 2012

-

Selby, 2017

The dierence-in-dierence (DID) technique is an econometric tool rst applied in the 19th
century to control for before-and-after implementation of a treatment or policy

19 (National Research

Council and others, 2004; Branas et al., 2011; Morris et al., 2014; Dimick and Ryan, 2014 are
examples of health-related research that have applied a DID analysis).

A standard DID model

to evaluate the eects of a Naloxone access law by dierentiating between treatment and control
(untreated) states is represented by:

19
More information is available at:
methods/dierence-dierence-estimation

https://www.mailman.columbia.edu/research/population-health-
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T ODDrateit = α0 + α1 Xit + α2 N ALit Tit + νi + ωt + it
where

ODDrateit is the opioid overdose death rate in state i

(1)

t Xit is a vector of time- varying

in year .

covariates that control for factors such as: presence of a medical marijuana law, quantities of drug
prescription, amount of heroin related crime, high-injury and risky occupations, population density,
income inequality, uninsured rate, college attainment rate, spending on education, unemployment
rate, and poverty rate.

N ALit Tit

is the DID variable which takes a value of 1 if the state had a

Naloxone access law in that particular year and zero otherwise.

νi

is an unobservable, time-invariant

state eect, which subsumes the main eect of the Naloxone law, while
eects which subsumes the main eect of the variable T (time).

it

ωt

is a vector of year xed

is an error term.

The standard DID model presented in equation (1) raises a possible issue with endogeneity for
the

NAL variable, i.e.

does the level of a state's opioid overdose death rate inuence enactment of

a Naloxone access law in that state? We tested for this by examining state overdose death rates in
the year prior to enactment of an access law compared to rates in states without an access law. To
account for dierent years of means, we subtracted the state means from the national mean in that
year (for non-access law states, 2014 overdose death rates are used). A t-test showed no statistical
dierence between access law and no access law states (t = -0.611, p =0.544).

Based upon this

evidence, endogeneity in equation (1) is not seen as an issue.
Under a non-spatial econometric estimation, observations do not depend on location (LeSage
and Pace (2009); Elhorst (2014)). They are independent points and therefore there is no correlation
between them and their neighbors. However, LeSage and Pace (2009) explain the case of spatial
dependency: In contrast to point observations, for a region we rely on the coordinates of an interior
point representing the center (the centroid). An important point is that in spatial regression models
each observation corresponds to a location or region. In non-spatial models, each observation has
a mean of

xi β

and a random component

i

where the observation i represents a region or point in

space at one location and is considered to be independent of observations in other locations. In other
words, independent or statistically independent observations imply that

E(i j ) = E(i )E(j ) = 0.

This assumption of independence greatly simplies models.
In most cases, this assumption is not applicable and observations located at dierent points or
regions are dependent (LeSage and Pace (2009). Suppose we have two regions (neighbors) i and j.
If these two regions are spatially correlated and normality for error terms is assumed, then:

yi ←→ yj
where the dependent variable

i, and vice versa.

y

in region

j

(2)

inuences the dependent variable in its neighbor region

All spatial models have a weight matrix

W,

which quanties the spillover between regions.

Elhorst (2014) expresses the weight matrix as a tool to describe the spatial arrangement of the
geographical units in the sample. There are variety of units of measurement for spatial dependency
such as neighbors, distance, and links (Getis (2007)).

In this study, we conducted and applied

dierent weight matrices and chose the appropriate contiguity weight matrix based on the nature
of the research. As Debarsy et al. (2012) point out given the cross-border shopping a weight matrix
for neighbors with border touching seems intuitively appealing.
The use of spatial dierence-in-dierence (SDID) models has gained attraction in urban economics in recent years (Dubé et al. (2014); Sunak and Madlener (2014); Hembree et al. (2005)).
However, to the best of our knowledge few studies perform SDID model in public health and public
policy research (Andrade (2016); Chagas et al. (2016)) are noted exceptions). We argue that opioid
overdose death rates and Naloxone access laws need to be assessed within a regional framework.
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For example, adaptation of a policy in one state could be followed by surrounding states as well.
Marijuana legalization status in U.S. states is a good example of mimicking law enactment in neighboring states. In such cases, not only would the variable of interest be aected by its own control
variables, but it also may be aected by its neighbors' control variables.
The medication (in our case Naloxone) can be transferred across state borders.

In this case,

even though in one state there is no Naloxone access law, users can buy Naloxone in a neighboring
state and use it in their home state. This transmission of Naloxone could aect the opioid overdose
death rates in neighboring states. The opioid epidemic in the U.S. is clustered in specic regions
such as Appalachia and the Southwest

20 , 21 (see Rudd et al. (2016)). Therefore, analyzing the

eectiveness of the Naloxone access law on opioid overdose deaths needs to be investigated within
a regional framework rather than a standard state level analysis.
When a spatial component (whether it be the spatial component of dependent variable, control
variables or the error term) is statistically signicant, the coecients estimated by non-spatial
models (in our case a general DID) would be biased. Also variances may be non-ecient (Grith
(2005); LeSage and Pace (2009)).

Accordingly, statistical tests such as t- and F-tests may be

invalid, leading researchers to interpret their results improperly. We conduct the estimation process
by adding the spatial component to a non-spatial econometric analysis in a panel data framework.
The general SDID model developed for opioid overdose death rate can be written as

T ODDrateit =α0 + α1 N ALit Tit +

X

αj Xijt + ρW T ODDratejt + ϑW N ALjt Tjt

(3)

+ θW Xjt + νi + ωt + it

TODDrate stands for the opioid overdose deaths per 100,000 population in state i and time t,
NAL represents a dummy variable whether the state has a Naloxone access law in a given year. X is
where

a vector of demographic variables described above, while
respectively.

The terms

WTODDrate, WNALT, WX,

νi

and

and

W

ωt

are state and year xed eects,

denote the spatial components of

opioid overdose death, Naloxone access law, other control variables, and the error term.

ρ,ϑ,and θ

represent the spillover eects of the dependent variable, independent variables, and the error term.
They explain the eects of dependent variable, independent variables and error term of neighboring
states

j

i

on the dependent variable in specic state .

We examine the impact of Naloxone access laws with three dierent approaches. First, following
Rees et al. (2017), we impose a dummy variable for passage of a Naloxone access law at the state
level. For the second approach, we assess the impact of access laws by the number of days after
eective date of the law. To allow for the eects of the law to change over time, a quadratic form
of the days after the law enactment was included in this approach. By imposing the quadratic form
of the days after law variable, we will be able to see whether or not the eect of the law is constant
or diminishing over time. Finally, the third approach provides for a breakdown of access laws by
their provisions. Since Naloxone access laws are not homogenous, to evaluate the eects of the law
on opioid overdose deaths one needs to dierentiate between the provisions included in each law.
For the

X

vector of control variables, there is some evidence in the literature that poverty, unem-

ployment, uninsured rate, and income inequality are each positively correlated with opioid overdose
deaths (Galea et al. (2003); Nandi et al. (2006); Gatti et al. (2007); Shah et al. (2012)). Conversely,
income and education have negative relationships with opioid overdose deaths (Richardson et al.,

20
For more details, please refer to: http://www.realclearhealth.com/articles/2017/06/14/analysis_peering_into_
the_nations_opioid_crisis_through_a_regional_lens_110633.html
21
For more details, please refer to: http://www.acutisdiagnostics.com/sites/default/les/Peeling_Back_the
_Curtain_on_Regional_Variation_in_the_Opioid_Crisis_FINAL_June_2017%20%281%29.pdf
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2015). We expect to see positive and signicant eects of availability of legal and illegal opioids on
opioid overdose death rates. Medical marijuana laws should have a negative eect on opioid overdose death rates because we expect opioids and marijuana to be substitutes. Laws allowing medical
marijuana will likely reduce the cost of receiving marijuana and therefore decrease the quantity
demanded of opioids.

4

Data

Data for constructing the model come from a number of dierent sources. We use data from CDC
Wonder for 1999-2014

22 which contain the universe of overdose deaths and overdose death rates by

state in the U.S. We focus on the 48 continuous states of the U.S. and Washington, D.C. over this
time period. These data were compiled using underlying cause of death compressed mortality les.
The number of opioid-overdose deaths by state were classied using the International Classication
of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10). We include deaths coded as unintentional (X4044), homicide

23 Among deaths with opioid

(X85), undetermined intent (Y10Y14), and suicide cases (X 6064).

overdose as the underlying cause, the type of opioid involved is indicated by the following ICD10 multiple cause-of-death codes: opioids (T40.0, T40.1, T40.2, T40.3, T40.4, or T40.6); heroin
(T40.1); natural and semisynthetic opioids (T40.2); methadone (T40.3); and synthetic opioids,
other than methadone (T40.4).
For our variable of interest, we create measures of whether the state had a Naloxone law, the
various provisions of each law, and eective dates from the Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System

24 For control variables in the

(PDAPS).

drug price.

X

vector, Unick et al. (2014) recommend including illicit

Without having access to such data for our time frame, we instead control for drug

arrests and quantity of prescription drug sales.

Sale and possession related arrests of opium or

cocaine and their derivatives (Morphine, Heroin, and Codeine) were provided by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation to control for illicit opioids supply. The availability of prescription opioids came
from controlled substances transactions of prescriptions available through Automated Reports and
Consolidated Ordering System (ARCOS).

25

State level economic variables such as per pupil spending on education, poverty rate, unemployment rate as well as population density and uninsured rate were obtained from U.S. Census Bureau.
Income inequality, high school attainment, and the college attainment data were obtained from the
U.S. state-level income inequality data and annual state-level measures of human capital attainment

26 Per capita personal income was based on the information provided
27 Employment in mining, construction, and manuby Federal Reserve Bank of ST. Louis (FRED).
28 Medical marijuana
facturing and labor force are collected from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
29 Finally, the
law was collected from the leading source for pros and cons of controversial issues.
at Mark W. Frank home page.

spatial weight matrix - the shape le of U.S. states consisting of the latitudinal and longitudinal
coordinates of all the 48 states and D.C. was adapted from the U.S. Census Bureau (Tiger) report.
To control for spillover eects of Naloxone access laws, the 48 continuous U.S. states plus Dis-

22

National Vital Statistics System (NVSS)
As a robustness check we test the total number of opioid overdose deaths as the dependent variable (not restricted
to ICD-10 codes).
24
Available at: http://pdaps.org/
25
Available at: https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/arcos/retail_opioid_summary/
26
Available at: http://www.shsu.edu/eco_mwf/inequality.html
27
Available at: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/release?rid=151
28
Available at: https://www.bls.gov/sae/data.htm
29
Available at: http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881
23
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trict of Colombia were included in our analysis. In spatial analysis, continuity and neighborhoods
play vital roles (Tobler (1970)). We focused on contiguous states based on the rst law of geography: everything is related to everything else, closer things even more (Tobler (1970)). Descriptive
statistics for each variable are reported in table 4 along with the expect signs of Naloxone access
law and control variables. Following previous studies (Rees et al. (2017)) which found the negative
eect of the Naloxone access law on opioid overdose deaths, we expect to have a negative eects of
the law on opioid overdose death rates.

5

Methods

5.1

Exploring spatial dependency in opioid overdose death rates across states

As we mentioned in previous section, the economic distance concept is a motivation for spatial
spillover eects.

Before analyzing spatial dependency by corresponding econometrics models, an

intuitive way to identify clusters is by looking at the map of the overdose death rates.

Figure 3

shows the map of opioid overdose death rates for 1999 and 2014.
Opioid overdose death rates have increased over time. In 1999, only two states had an overdose
death rate between 8-10 percent.

By 2014, 33 states had an overdose death rate between 8-30

percent. Also, some spatial clusters are obvious especially in 2014. New Mexico had the highest
opioid overdose death rate in 1999. In 2014, its surrounding states also had high rates of overdose
deaths. Substantial clustering also exists on the east coast.
Given the fact that opioid overdose death rates show visual evidence of clustering among states,
the next step is to detect spatial autocorrelation. Spatial autocorrelation measures the interrelationship of opioid overdose death rate across neighboring states. A common index to nd out the

30 As pointed out by Chen and Haynes (2015),

spatial autocorrelation is the Global Moran's I index.

Moran's I is a test on a yearly base. A signicant and positive z-value for Moran's I index implies a
positive spatial autocorrelation. Table 4 shows the results for Moran's I index for two points of time
and its z-statistics and p-value. These tests reveal that there is a signicant spatial autocorrelation
among state level opioid overdose death rate in the U.S. This means the U.S. opioid overdose death
rate tend to be clustered together.
Moran's I index assesses the overall presence of spatial autocorrelation. This index could oset
the eects of spatial autocorrelation if some observations have a positive spatial autocorrelation
while the others show a negative spatial autocorrelation. For further examination, we also report
the results of local Moran's I test (LISA). Scatter plots of LISA shows observations in four dierent
quadrants: High value observation surrounded by high value observations (i.e. QI: HH) and 3 other
clustering for LH (QII), HL (QIV), and LL (QIII) quadrants. Figure 4 provides Moran scatter plots
of the US opioid overdose death rates in 1999 and 2014. This gure illustrates that in both years,
most of the states with high overdose rate are surrounded by states with high overdose rates. This
also is true for the states with low overdose death rates. Thus, we apply a rst-order contiguity
weight matrix.
The existence of statistically signicant spatial autocorrelation among states implies that the
ordinary least square estimations (non-spatial models) may lead toward biased estimates of the
regression results. Therefore, it is appropriate to apply spatial models in the analysis of Naloxone
access laws and opioid overdose death rate. As Delgado and Florax (2015) point out, identication

31 is

of causal eects is no longer valid if the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA)

30

More information is available at: http://ceadserv1.nku.edu/longa//geomed/ppa/doc/globals/Globals.htm
Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption: potential outcomes for person i are unrelated to the treatment status
of other individuals
31
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics

Variable

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

Opioid overdose death rates (per 100K pop)
Total opioid overdose death rates ( per 100K pop)
NAL 1
NAL 2
NAL 3
NAL 4
NAL 5
NAL 6
NAL 7
NAL 8
NAL 9
NAL 10
NAL 11
NAL 12
Days after Naloxone access law (days/1000)
Square of the days after Naloxone access law (days/1000)
Presence of Medical marijuana law
Heroin arrest rate (arrests/100k pop)
Opioid prescription (kg/100k pop)
Employment ratio (%)
Population density (Pop./mi2)
Income inequality (Income share for the top %10) (%)
College attainment (the total number of college
graduates/ the total state population) (%)
Spending on education ($1000)
Poverty rate (%)
Unemployment rate (%)
Uninsured rate (%)
Median HH income (Thousand dollars)
Per capita income (Thousand dollars)
Number of observations

6.30
6.62
0.090
0.051
0.052
0.024
0.047
0.048
0.023
0.061
0.022
0.051
0.040
0.008
0.142
349
0.21
139.57
56.527
0.14
338.50
44.44
0.19

4.08
4.30
0.274
0.213
0.213
0.142
0.206
0.208
0.139
0.229
0.133
0.209
0.183
0.086
0.573
1,978
0.41
105.82
41.023
0.04
1,221.79
4.90
0.04

0.15
0.15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.61
6.911
0.002
5.028
33.27
0.10

29.94
32.12
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
5.015
25,150
1
761.43
496.506
0.26
9,655.19
62.17
0.45

+
+
+
+
-/+

9.22
13.30
5.82
13.23
47.15
36.81

2.83
3.37
2.06
3.97
8.36
8.45

4.16
5.60
2.30
3.00
29.29
20.56
784

20.60
23.90
13.70
26.10
76.16
70.46

+
+
+
-

Table 5: Moran's I index for U.S. opioid overdose death rate

1999

2014

Moran's I

0.407

0.329

z-statistics

5.413

3.842

0.01

0.01

p-value

Expected
sign of
coecient

-
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Figure 3: Opioid overdose death rates in the U.S. 1999 and 2014
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Figure 4: Moran's i scatter plot of U.S. state's opioid overdose death rates (1999 and 2014)

violated. A SUTVA violation means that in determining the treatment eect, considering one's own
treatment status is not sucient. Treatment status of neighboring regions (in our case states) has
to be taken into account as well (Delgado and Florax (2015)).

5.2

Spatial econometric analysis

There are ve dierent spatial models. The rst of which is the spatial autoregressive lag model
(SAR) as shown in equation (3).

Second, a Spatial Error Model (SEM) assumes dependency in

error term. SLX model or spatial lag of control variable assumes the control variables could play a
direct role in determining dependent variables. Lastly, there are Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) and
Spatial Error Durbin Model (SDEM) that include spatial lags of the control variables as well as the
dependent variable and a spatial lag of the control variables (WX), as well as spatially dependent
disturbances.
As discussed above and based upon the results of the spatial analysis, we have strong reasons to
suspect that the spatial spillovers are important both theoretically and empirically when studying
the eect of access policy both with state and temporal variation. To evaluate the eects of the
Naloxone access laws on opioid overdose death rates, we rst test a general non-spatial specication
against SAR and SEM models by conducting a Lagrange Multiplier.
models were the appropriate specication

In both cases, the spatial

32 (LM for non-spatial against SAR = 89.8 and P-value

= 0.00, LM for non-spatial against SEM = 39.3 and p-value = 0.00).

The next step is testing

SAR against SEM. By applying the robust LM test we failed to reject that the SAR model is the

33 = 91.47 > LMERROR34 = 40.99). Knowing that the

most appropriate specication (LMLAG

SAR, SEM, and SLX models are nested within SDM and SDEM and for applied works LeSage
recommends applying either a SDM or SDEM

35 , we continue our estimations by focusing on SDM

model which is a global spatial econometric model encompassing both SAR and SLX models.

6

Spatial Results

As discussed in the previous sections, it is important to consider the spillover eects between states
in regards to overdose death rates and Naloxone access laws. We argue that a rst-order contiguity
weight matrix is good for several reasons.

32

First, we need the weight matrix to be exogenous to

For more information please refer to Florax et al. (2003)
LMLAG stands for LM spatial lag
34
LMERROR stands for LM spatial error
35
For more information please refer to LeSage (2014)
33
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our estimation, and a rst-order contiguity matrix ts this requirement.

Secondly, geographical

proximity has been shown to be important for spillovers (e.g., Jae (1989); Jae et al. (1993);
Attila (2000), Chagas et al. (2016)).
Table 6 presents the spatial regressions results for Models 1 and 2 as discussed in section 3.
Within these two models, there are no statistically signicant direct eects of access laws on overdose
death rates. Indirect eects are positive and statistically signicant. When direct and indirect eects
are combined, both models show positive impacts, meaning that opioid overdose death rates increase
following the implementation of Naloxone access laws.
Table 6: Estimation results for two models of access laws: dummy (NAL 1), days after passage of
access law

Determinants

Model 1
Direct
0.049
(0.894)
-

Indirect
4.687***
(0.000)
-

Days after NAL 1 law 2

-

-

Medical marijuana law

0.415
(0.230)
0.006***
(0.000)
0.011***
(0.000)
48.511***
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.170)
0.011
(0.780)
-0.101
(0.101)
0.127
(0.324)
-0.087
(0.525)
0.024
(0.823)
0.004
(0.927)
-3.688***
(0.000)

1.175
(0.195)
0.007
(0.038)
0.029
(0.000)
-58.280
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.732)
-0.026
(0.788)
0.034
(0.808)
-0.151
(0.614)
0.009
(0.977)
0.340
(0.174)
0.062
(0.578)
2.876
(0.075)
0.26
(0.000)
0.85
784

Naloxone access law 1
Days after NAL 1 law

Heroin related arrest
Opioid prescription
Employment Ratio
Population density
Income inequality index
College graduate
Education spending per student
Poverty
Unemployment
Uninsured
Per capita income
ρ

R2
Observations

Model 2
Direct
-0.56
(0.170)
0.0001
(0.233)
0.509
(0.152)
0.006***
(0.000)
0.011***
(0.000)
44.024***
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.352)
0.010
(0.801)
-0.087
(0.150)
0.177
(0.183)
-0.095
(0.495)
0.006
(0.956)
0.000
(0.988)
-3.500***
(0.000)

Indirect
3.270***
(0.007)
-0.0006**
(0.062)
1.534
(0.123)
0.006*
(0.066)
0.029***
(0.000)
-56.75***
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.826)
-0.015
(0.872)
0.039
(0.782)
-0.095
(0.756)
0.075
(0.822)
0.382
(0.171)
0.032
(0.780)
2.385
(0.165)
0.27
(0.000)
0.85
784

Note: P-values in parenthesis
*, **, and *** refer to 10% 5%, and 1% signicance levels, respectively.
Model 3 dierentiates between laws by breaking them down into their specic provisions and
reveals more information about the impacts of laws by dierentiating based upon provisions. Table
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7 shows the estimation results for access laws by provision.

Given the statistically signicant

spatial autocorrelation coecient (ρ), the parameter estimates in the two-way xed eects spatial
autoregressive model cannot be interpreted as non-spatial models.

We estimate the direct and

indirect eects to yield an interpretation of the spatial spillover eects.
The results in Table 7 reveal that the direct, indirect and total eects of the Naloxone access law
are heterogeneous when we break down these laws by their provisions. The direct eect indicates
the eects of the treatment status on own state opioid overdose death rate, and indirect eect
shows the eects of provisions on surrounding states. Out of eleven provisions, ve (immunity from
professional sanctions for prescribers (NAL 4), immunity from professional sanctions for dispensers
(NAL 7), third party authorizations (NAL 8), immunity from civil liability for layperson (NAL 11),
and removing criminal liability for possession of naloxone without a prescription (NAL 12)) have
statistically signicant direct eects. Positive direct eects occur for NAL 4, NAL 11, and NAL
12 - meaning these provisions increase overdose death rates in the states where they are enacted.
Negative direct eects (provisions decrease overdose death rates in states where enacted) are found
for NAL 7 and 8.
Four provisions have signicant indirect eects with the same sign as the direct eects (NAL 4,
NAL 7, NAL 11, and NAL 12). In each case, indirect eects are much larger than direct eects,
from 1.78 and 4.99 times greater than the corresponding direct eects. All provision variables with
either a signicant direct or indirect eect (NAL 4, NAL 7, NAL 8, NAL 10, NAL 11, and NAL
12) also have signicant total eects. Thus, both positive and negative impacts are found to exist
for Naloxone law provisions with spillover eects dominating the direct eects.
Other inuences on opioid overdose death rates include heroin related arrests and opioid prescription with positive, statistically signicant direct, indirect and total eects. Thus, more heroin
related crime and prescription opioids in one state will increase the opioid overdose death rate both
within that state as well as surrounding states.

Employment of those who work at mining, con-

struction and manufacture industries also increases opioid overdose death rates within the state,
but decreases this rate in rst order surrounding states.
Unemployment rate has positive and statistically signicant indirect and total eects on opioid
overdose death. The implication of these positive coecients is that a higher unemployment rate
in one state will increase opioid overdose death rates in surrounding states. Per capita income has
statistically signicant eects on opioid overdose death rates - negative direct and positive indirect
eects. The implication is that increased per capita income in state i reduces opioid overdose death
rate in state i, but increases death rate in neighboring j states. States with higher per capita incomes
and population densities have lower opioid overdose death rates, while less urban states with lower
per capita incomes suer from higher opioid overdose death rate.
These results are consistent with Keyes et al. (2014), but contradict Gatti et al. (2007), whose
research focused on Italy. In the Gatti and Tremblay study, the authors found drug overdose deaths
were explained mainly by wealth.

However, without an exact denition for the total number of

deaths from drug overdose, the reason for discrepancy could be the denition of drug overdose.
Also from Table 7, population density has a signicant and negative direct and indirect eect on
opioid overdose death rate.

The implication of these negative coecients is that a more dense

area has less opioid overdose death rate both within the state and in adjacent states.
graduate rate has a negative and signicant direct eect on opioid overdose death rate.

College
Other

variables (medical marijuana law, income inequality, education spending per student, poverty rate,
and uninsured rate) do not have signicant eects on overdose death rates.
Finally, to check the sensitivity of our results, a new dependent variable of total opioid overdose
death rates introduced in section 4 is examined. As pointed out by Rees et al. (2017), opioid overdose
deaths published by CDC is based on the underlying cause of death (accidental, intentional, and
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Table 7: Direct and indirect eects of SDM model (Based on Model 3)

Determinants
Naloxone access law 2
Naloxone access law 3
Naloxone access law 4
Naloxone access law 5
Naloxone access law 6
Naloxone access law 7
Naloxone access law 8
Naloxone access law 9
Naloxone access law 10
Naloxone access law 11
Naloxone access law 12
Medical marijuana law
Heroin related arrest
Opioid prescription
Employment Ratio
Population density
Income inequality index
College graduate rate
Education spending per student
Poverty rate
Unemployment rate
Uninsured rate
Per capita income
ρ

R2
Observations

Direct eect
3.335
(0.481)
-1.774
(0.715)
14.256***
(0.000)
-0.115
(0.970)
-2.233
(0.516)
-10.862***
(0.001)
-1.918***
(0.003)
-0.366
(0.666)
-1.337
(0.108)
1.918***
(0.016)
2.667***
(0.015)
0.077
(0.816)
0.004***
(0.000)
0.012***
(0.000)
53.368***
(0.000)
-0.003**
(0.027)
0.045
(0.248)
-0.115*
(0.053)
0.082
(0.515)
-0.120
(0.380)
0.140
(0.213)
-0.020
(0.655)
-3.540***
(0.000)

Indirect eect
-0.322
(0.978)
6.429
(0.596)
25.337***
(0.004)
2.778
(0.730)
-6.854
(0.444)
-21.315**
(0.023)
-1.287
(0.420)
-0.170
(0.943)
-3.426
(0.145)
6.469***
(0.008)
12.981***
(0.000)
0.177
(0.837)
0.005
(0.116)
0.028***
(0.000)
-53.916***
(0.005)
-0.010*
(0.062)
-0.049
(0.583)
0.052
(0.699)
-0.060
(0.829)
-0.152
(0.653)
0.648**
(0.014)
-0.037
(0.741)
3.245**
(0.044)
0.23
(0.000)
0.87
784

Total eect
3.012
(0.832)
4.655
(0.744)
39.593***
(0.000)
2.662
(0.776)
-9.087
(0.397)
-32.178***
(0.004)
-3.206*
(0.103)
-0.536
(0.843)
-4.763*
(0.097)
8.387***
(0.003)
15.648***
(0.000)
0.255
(0.804)
0.010***
(0.006)
0.040***
(0.000)
-0.547
(0.978)
-0.013**
(0.026)
-0.004
(0.965)
-0.063
(0.676)
0.022
(0.943)
-0.272
(0.465)
0.788***
(0.004)
-0.058
(0.662)
-0.295
(0.863)

Note: P-values in parenthesis
*, **, and *** refer to 10% 5%, and 1% signicance levels, respectively.
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undetermined intent) (Ruhm (2016)). In robustness check the dependent variable is a comprehensive
measure of opioid overdoses, which is rather similar to our limited opioid overdose death variable.
The results of the estimation of equation 3 with the new dependent variable are reported in Table
7.

These results are very similar in terms of statistical signicance and coecient signs for the

Naloxone access law provisions compared to those in Table 7.

7

Conclusions

In this research, we examined the impact of Naloxone access laws enacted by state legislatures
around the U.S. on opioid overdose deaths and their spillover eects to surrounding states.

We

applied spatial econometrics models to avoid potential bias in coecients, which arises by ignoring
spatial autocorrelation in ordinary least square models. Our regression results from all three models
suggest that while some signicant inuences exist on overdose death rates within the state, spillover
eects of access laws dominate in terms of magnitude  about four times larger than signicant direct
eects in Table 7. Thus, Naloxone access laws have more regional than state level eects.
Breaking down access laws by their provisions, our results show that enactment of a Naloxone
access law eects opioid overdose death rates both within the state and in neighboring states.
We nd positive direct, indirect and total eects for law provisions that: provide immunity from
professional sanction for prescriber, provide immunity from civil liability for layperson, and remove
criminal liability for possession of Naloxone. These three provisions increase aggregate opioid related
death rates both within the state and neighboring states. Based upon our results, these provisions
do not help reduce opioid overdose death rates.
Conversely, three Naloxone access law provisions (i.e. immunity from professional sanction for
dispenser, third parties' authorization to prescribe Naloxone, and immunity from criminal liability
for a layperson administering Naloxone) have negative total eects, reducing opioid overdose death
rates in aggregate, mainly within neighboring states.

Immunity from professional sanction for

dispenser decreases opioid overdose death rates within neighboring states.

Also, provisions that

remove criminal, rather than civil liabilities decrease overdose death rates.
It is useful to compare the magnitude of the aggregate eects from Naloxone access law provisions
with the eects for heroin related arrests and drug prescriptions. To do that, we use the state level
means to compare relative magnitudes. For example, if an overdose prevention policy could increase
heroin arrests by 100% and reduce opioid prescriptions by 50%, the impact of this policy would
reduce overdose death by 2.79 and 1.13 per 100,000 population, respectively. Conversely, the total
eect of enactment of a Naloxone access law containing the three most common provisions (NAL 8,
10, and 11) results in a slight increase in the overdose death rate of 0.43 per 100,000 population.
Spatial econometrics has an important role to play in research on drug epidemics (see e.g.,
Partridge et al. (2012) for a general discussion of the importance of spatial econometrics).

36 We

demonstrate in this paper use of conventional, non-spatial analyses are biased in this environment.
Overall, due to a signicant spatial autoregressive component, the opioid overdose death rate in
one particular state is associated with opioid overdose death rates in neighboring states.

This

result means there are spillover eects in opioid overdose death rates among neighboring regions
(states). An increasing trend in opioid overdose death rates in one particular state may be followed
by neighboring states as well and vice versa. Thus, opioid overdose death rates represent more a
regional epidemic rather than a state level epidemic.
We relate the mixed positive and negative results of our research to the neo-classical economics

36

For more information, please refer to Gibbons and Overman (2012), McMillen (2012), and Corrado and Fingleton
(2012).
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Table 8: Direct and indirect eects of SDM model for the unrestricted dataset (Based on Model 3)

Determinants
Naloxone access law 2
Naloxone access law 3
Naloxone access law 4
Naloxone access law 5
Naloxone access law 6
Naloxone access law 7
Naloxone access law 8
Naloxone access law 9
Naloxone access law 10
Naloxone access law 11
Naloxone access law 12
Medical marijuana law
Heroin related arrest
Opioid prescription
Employment Ratio
Population density
Income inequality index
College graduate rate
Education spending per student
Poverty rate
Unemployment rate
Uninsured rate
Per capita income
ρ

R2
Observations

Direct eect
3.355
(0.484)
-2.001
(0.703)
14.764***
(0.000)
-0.365
(0.911)
-2.001
(0.581)
-11.346***
(0.001)
-2.098***
(0.002)
-0.478
(0.593)
-1.423
(0.115)
2.120***
(0.014)
2.916***
(0.009)
0.077
(0.816)
0.004***
(0.000)
0.012***
(0.000)
53.368***
(0.000)
-0.003**
(0.027)
0.045
(0.248)
-0.115*
(0.053)
0.082
(0.515)
-0.120
(0.380)
0.140
(0.213)
-0.020
(0.655)
-3.540***
(0.000)

Indirect eect
-3.926
(0.761)
8.991
(0.506)
29.174***
(0.001)
4.990
(0.575)
-8.430
(0.399)
-25.767**
(0.010)
-1.897
(0.261)
-0.609
(0.798)
-3.662
(0.145)
7.305***
(0.005)
12.845***
(0.000)
0.177
(0.837)
0.005
(0.116)
0.028***
(0.000)
-53.916***
(0.005)
-0.010*
(0.062)
-0.049
(0.583)
0.052
(0.699)
-0.060
(0.829)
-0.152
(0.653)
0.648**
(0.014)
-0.037
(0.741)
3.245**
(0.044)
0.23
(0.000)
0.87
784

Total eect
-0.370
(0.980)
6.989
(0.661)
43.938***
(0.000)
4.624
(0.651)
-10.431
(0.376)
-37.113***
(0.002)
-3.996*
(0.057)
0.130
(0.962)
-5.085*
(0.094)
9.426***
(0.002)
15.761***
(0.000)
0.255
(0.804)
0.010***
(0.006)
0.040***
(0.000)
-0.547
(0.978)
-0.013**
(0.026)
-0.004
(0.965)
-0.063
(0.676)
0.022
(0.943)
-0.272
(0.465)
0.788***
(0.004)
-0.058
(0.662)
-0.295
(0.863)

Note: P-values in parenthesis
*, **, and *** refer to 10%, 5%, and 1% signicance levels, respectively.
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concept of consumers trying to maximize their utility. The consumption of opioids provides utility
for a typical addict, although some economists have characterized an addict as an imperfect rational
behavior that is struggling between ending addiction and adoring opioid consumption (Chaloupka
et al. (1999)). Enactment of a Naloxone access law may aect current and future opioid consumption
of addicted persons by reducing the cost of opioid consumption.

By having access to Naloxone

(sometimes inexpensive, but quick and eective medicine to reverse the consequences of overdosing),
addicts may increase their propensity to consume opioids. Addicts thereby adjust their response to
the law by continued opioid use with less fear and uncertainty of dealing with an overdose death (the
moral hazard problem). The end result is that while administering Naloxone prevents an overdose
death, the expanded ability to administer Naloxone does not reduce the death rate.
Our ndings have policy implications for both federal and states governments. The provisions
with negative coecients (immunity from professional sanction for dispensers, third party authorization, and immunity from criminal liability for users) should denitely be included in any access
law. However, it is problematic to interpret the results of Model 3 (model with Naloxone access law
provisions) as some provisions should be included in laws (those with negative eects) while other
provisions should be excluded from laws (those with positive eects). In practice, provisions with
opposite eect signs often are included in most laws, examples include NAL 4 and 7 along with
NAL 10 and 11. So interpretation of single provision eect without considering the eects of other
provisions is not seen as particularly useful for policy implications.
A more preferred interpretation of Model 3 results is to aggregate across statistically signicant
eects for all provisions. When we assess the aggregate impacts for direct, indirect, and total eects,
we nd that in each case the net eect of Naloxone access laws is to increase opioid death rates
both within and outside the states where these laws have been enacted. Looking across multiple
provisions, these ndings provide no statistical evidence that these laws reduce opioid death rates.
Our ndings need to be viewed within a narrow context of Naloxone access laws as the sole
policy response to the opioid crisis. As a policy response, Naloxone treats only the symptoms of
addiction by preventing immediate death from an overdose, but does not prevent or treat addiction
as the underlying cause of opioid related overdose deaths. Our results show that when access laws
are evaluated in isolation of any other state level policy response to opioids, increasing access to
Naloxone does not reduce, but leads to increased overdose death rates.

Thus, the moral hazard

perspective of this policy is the more accurate assessment of the outcome when access laws are
the only policy.

Immunity from civil liability for users and immunity from criminal liability for

possession of Naloxone are provisions that show the change in behavior of the users and we see a
positive eect of these laws on opioid overdose death rates.
Enactment of a Naloxone access law is a starting point in implementing and expanding access to
save lives seems a necessary strategy, but not a sucient response to the overdose problem. Apart
from the law enactment, both federal and state governments should consider the next steps such as
policy recommendation presented by Clark (2017) (e.g. team-based care model, more collaboration
with pharmacists, minimize cost barriers to have access to Naloxone, expanding harm reduction
treatment model). Both federal and state governments need to be involved in preventive policies
more focused on regions not one specic state.
We recognize several limitations in our research. First, many states have only recently enacted
Naloxone access laws.

Since our data cover years 1999 to 2014, for those 10 states with newly

enacted laws in 2014, we do not have post implementation data.

Furthermore, 10 more states

enacted laws in 2013, so that only one year of data is included in our dataset. Empirical results
may change with more post implementation data for these 20 states. Second, county level analysis
would be preferable to assess the spillover eects across states, but these data were not consistently
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available for overdose death rates.

37

Further research should consider applying a hierarchical analysis and provide spillover estimates
at both levels of the hierarchy (including both county and state level data in county level model).
In addition, research should examine enactment of Naloxone access laws in conjunction with other
policy responses, such as increased intervention and treatment programs for addiction to assess the
impact of multiple policies on overdose death rates.

37

For example, the CDC does not publish county level observations with less than nine overdose deaths.
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